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Abstract 
This paper examines the impacts of the financial, food and fuel crises on the livelihoods of 
low-income households Nigeria. It uses primary household level data from Nigeria to analyse 
the impacts of induced price variability on household welfare. Our results indicate that 
aggregate shocks have significant adverse effects on household consumption, human capital, 
and labour decisions with a degree of impact variability between northern and southern 
regions of the country. We find that the coping strategies adopted by the poor to deal with the 
short-term effects of the crises, and which include substitution for lower quality food, 
increasing the intensity of work, withdrawing children from school – especially girls – and 
engaging children in child labour, can lock households in a low-income equilibrium or 
poverty trap. Provided that covariate shocks exacerbate these effects, tackling the effects of 
covariate risks becomes central for present and future development policy.  
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1 Introduction 
Global and regional crises arising from the collapse of financial institutions, 
downturns in stock markets, and high levels of food and fuel price variability have 
become the focus of research and policy debate that seeks to identify the sources and 
impacts of such covariate events. More recently, the 2008 financial crisis, coupled 
with food and fuel price increases, were the source of great concern among the 
development community given their potential effects on poverty and well-being. 
Recent World Bank estimates suggest the 2008 financial crisis alone pushed nearly 53 
million people into poverty in 2009, and given the slowdown in economic growth in 
several developing economies, the cumulative poverty impacts were expected to rise 
even further, to an extra 73 million people worldwide (Chen and Ravallion 2009).  
The various forms of coping strategies that households resort to deal with crises can 
have long-lasting and devastating effects on present and future well-being, 
particularly among vulnerable groups. For example, when children are withdrawn 
from school, sent to work, or suffer early life malnutrition, they are likely to suffer 
from long-term (often lifetime) poverty (Hulme and Shepherd 2003; Baulch and 
Maset 2003). To the extent that covariate shocks exacerbate these vulnerabilities, a 
better understanding of crises becomes critical to design effective policy responses to 
address these episodes. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two important respects: first, it 
examines the impact of the food, fuel and financial crises on household livelihoods 
and living standards in Nigeria. The study of these crises has remained largely under-
analysed in the country due in part to the dearth and poor quality of existing data. To 
overcome this constraint, we employ household level survey data explicitly collected 
in the states of Kano and Lagos to unravel the extent to which households were 
affected by, and how they responded to, the crises. Second, the paper pays particular 
attention to the effect of crises on vulnerable groups, notably women and children. 
We focus on Nigeria for at least two important reasons: first, the country provides a 
good point of departure for the examination of the impact of aggregate shocks on 
resource-rich and commodity-oriented economies in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
region. Second, despite having experienced rapid economic growth over the past 
decade, and being the second largest economy in the region, Nigeria remains highly 
underdeveloped in its institutional and economic structures. More than 63 per cent of 
its population lives on less than US$1.25 a day, with agriculture contributing up to 45 
per cent of GDP and employing nearly 90 per cent of the rural population (DfiD 
2012). 
Overall, our results indicate that aggregate shocks have significant adverse effects on 
household consumption, asset accumulation and poverty status with a degree of 
variability in the effects and coping mechanisms between rural and urban settings and 
northern and southern areas of the country. In particular, we identify strategies 
adopted by vulnerable households to cope with food price variability. Of particular 
concern is households’ reduction in food consumption, especially among mothers and 
children; increased working hours to compensate for the income lost through price 
increases; the withdrawal of children from school; and the increasing incidence of 
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child labour. Although these strategies are generally short-term, they often have long-
term implications for household welfare.  
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of 
recent crises with especial focus on SSA and more specifically, Nigeria. Section 3 
describes the primary data used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the analytical 
approach and estimation strategy adopted to assess the effects of the crises whereas 
Section 5 discusses the overall findings with regard to coping strategies, notably cuts 
in food consumption, school dropouts, child labour and employment decisions. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes with reflections on the policy implications of the 
findings.  
2 Overview of the crises 
The food crisis came as a result of increases in the domestic and international prices 
of staple foods. The average world wheat price increased from US$126 per metric 
tonne (MT) in 2005/06 to US$249 per MT in 2008/09,1 and declined thereafter before 
increasing again in 2010/11. The price of maize increased steeply from less than 
US$150 per MT in 2005, to over US$300 per MT in 2011. This is confirmed by 
FAO’s (2011) report that world food prices were generally stable between 1970 and 
2000, but increased significantly from 2006 onwards.   
The initial grain price spike in 2008 was caused by a combination of factors, 
including drought and erratic weather patterns in major grain producing countries like 
Russia, Australia and Brazil; rising oil prices (oil prices increased by around 200 per 
cent between 2002 and 2007); and crop diseases across some countries.2 In addition, 
the growing demand for bio-fuels resulted in more resources being devoted to that in 
order to meet the growing demand for green energy, but at the expense of food 
production. This substitution effect was first observed as far back as the 1980s 
(Barnard 1983) and von Urff (2007) provided a detailed analysis of the resource 
trade-off between food and bio-fuel production. Chen et al. (2011) also analyse the 
adverse impact of bio-fuels on food production. However, it is important to note that 
although there may be (positive) correlation between fuel and food prices, and that 
fuel price changes may induce short-run price increases, the pass-through rate and 
impacts are low in labour-intensive agricultural systems, such as the Nigerian. Given 
that the pass-through rate to fertiliser and other agricultural input prices is high 
(Baffes 2007), the low usage of fertilisers and agricultural chemicals in many SSAn 
countries implies low pass-through rates and impacts. 
Many developing countries that rely on fuel imports also had food deficits, making 
them very vulnerable to fuel crisis (Senauer 2008). The fuel crisis was caused by 
persistent increases in the price of fuel on the international market. The global price of 
hydrocarbon fuels increased persistently from the beginning of 2002. The price per 
barrel reached a peak of US$120 in May 2008, from an average of under US$30 
before 2003. High energy prices fed into higher production and transport costs in the 
manufacturing sector, contributing to higher agricultural input prices. Given that on 
average 10 per cent of household expenditure goes to the purchase of energy (Baker 
                                                
1 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/wheat/YBtable20.asp 
2 http://chartsbin.com/view/oau 
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2008), rising prices had a significant impact on the overall household purchasing 
power, especially among poor households. Many countries suffered from the energy 
crisis because of supply bottlenecks and the growing demand for energy from 
emerging economies like Brazil, China and India, which contributed to higher prices. 
At a national level, the crisis was, in some countries, caused by market failures, 
shortage of foreign currency, and restrictive laws governing operations in the energy 
sector. Paradoxically, although Nigeria is Africa’s biggest oil producer, the country 
imports more than 80 per cent of its domestic fuel, owing to a lack of refining 
capacity, which makes the country vulnerable to international fuel price volatility.  
While oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria, Libya, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon 
benefitted from rising international oil prices, fuel-importing countries experienced a 
deteriorating balance of payments and fiscal positions. The decline in oil prices at the 
end of 2008 witnessed a partial reversal of fortunes for oil exporters, but some were 
able to draw down their reserves to smooth expenditures, and this reduced the impact 
of the volatility on their economies. 
The 2008 financial crisis was the result of the bursting of the real estate bubble in the 
USA, which, through the sub-prime mortgage market collapse, spiralled into a global 
financial market crisis that caused the downfall of major financial institutions and 
shook the financial foundations of many economies across the world. The crisis was, 
in part, a moral hazard problem posed by the financial sector,3 and governments 
across the world were forced to rescue banks in order to avoid contagion and 
complete collapse of the sector. The moral hazard background of the financial crisis is 
akin to that of the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s (Mishkin 1999; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 1996; Taylor 2009), but this time in countries that prided themselves for 
having developed well-functioning regulatory frameworks. Crotty (2008) argues that 
the crisis was worsened by the new international financial architecture characterised 
in part by bad to no regulation under the guise of capital market efficiency. 
The financial crisis imposed serious financial constraints on firms, leading to lower 
research and development and employment expenditures (Campello et al. 2009). 
Although some developing countries in SSA were shielded from the direct effects of 
the financial crisis by their low international financial integration, they still suffered 
indirectly because of the intertwining of global food, energy and financial markets. 
Further, financial inflows in the form of aid and grants, remittances and export 
earnings dwindled for some countries. The food and energy crises preceded the 
financial crisis, but the effects became convoluted with serious social and economic 
consequences across countries. In general, urban households seem to have suffered 
most from the crises because of their dependence on the cash economy, compared to 
consumer-producer rural households.  
The severity of the combination of crises caused social unrest and food insecurity 
across countries. Rising prices eroded household incomes, resulting in food riots in 
thirty countries around the world, including Mozambique, South Africa, Cameroon, 
Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. In Côte d’Ivoire, food and fuel riots 
followed a 29 per cent increase in the price of beef and a 42 per cent increase in the 
price of fuel in March 2008. Taxi drivers in Cameroon rioted following persistent fuel 
price increases, and households took to the streets demanding the availability of 
                                                
3 See Goodhart (2008). 
 4
affordable staple food. In South Africa, high unemployment and rising cost of living 
resulted in demonstrations and xenophobic attacks on immigrants whom locals 
accused of taking away their jobs.  
In response, some countries introduced protectionist policies and banned grain exports 
(e.g. Brazil in 2008; Russia in 2010; South Sudan and Ethiopia 2007). In Kenya, 
Benin and Senegal, price controls were imposed. On the other hand, other countries 
liberalised trade by reducing import taxes on food imports (e.g. Nigeria and 
Morocco). In 2007, Benin reduced import taxes on food products and eliminated the 
same on others. In general, restrictive trade policies induced greater volatility in 
markets, fuelling inflation, which was higher in low-income than in middle-income 
countries. Compared to Latin American economies, there was greater price volatility 
in SSA (World Bank 2011). The effect was worst in low-income countries where 
households devote a larger proportion of their expenditure to food (Diao et al. 2010). 
In Burundi, the cost of high food and fuel prices reached 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2008 
(IMF 2008).  
For all economies, fuel inflation was, on average, higher than food inflation. In 
Nigeria, and despite the agrarian structure of the economy, persistent scale and 
technical inefficiencies in the agriculture sector left the country reliant on food 
imports and thus exposed to global food price fluctuations (Olomola 2013). Poor 
households are reported to have reduced the intake of varieties of food like meat, 
vegetables and rice owing to high prices (IFPRI 2008).  
Figure 1: Trends in domestic food and non-food prices in Nigeria, 2003-11 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics. 
Figure 1 presents the trend of food prices in the country between 2003 and 2011. It 
shows that food prices in Nigeria have a steady long-term upward trend, characterised 
by short-term variability with pronounced peaks and troughs between mid-2000s and 
early 2008, which corresponded to the rise and fall of international food staples. 
Similar to food prices, fuel prices have followed a long-term upward trend, although 
displaying lower short-term variability than food prices in most states.  
This seems to confirm the evidence that food prices tend to be subject to more sudden 
variance in the short run than fuel prices. From a macro-perspective, this seems to 
reflect the fact that the Nigerian government has addressed the international fuel price 
volatility by subsidising the pump price. However, our micro-level analysis shows 
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that fuel subsidies may actually have had a muted effect on household consumption 
patterns, especially among the poor, whose access to fuels such as kerosene remains 
scarce and unpredictable. 
The financial crisis was transmitted through several channels, including credit 
availability, trade, and financial flows including remittances and aid. The main 
transmission channel for the fuel crisis was observed through changes in oil prices 
through high demand, especially from India and China. High oil prices meant more 
revenue in the earlier stages of the crisis, followed by declining international prices 
and hence revenues from 2009, although by 2010, oil exports had recovered to pre-
crisis levels. On the other hand, remittances increased significantly globally from 
2000 on, including in Nigeria where by 2007, the remittance to GDP ratio exceeded 5 
per cent (World Bank 2011). There was significant growth in this ratio between 2003 
and 2007, just before the financial crisis. Interestingly, the crisis did not cause a 
significant decline in remittances, but rather, just stunted the growth rate. For the 
households receiving remittances, the adverse effects of food and fuel price increases 
were partially mitigated.  
Another transmission mechanism through which the financial crisis impacted on the 
economy is reduced aid flows. Although the ratio of aid to GDP shows a positive 
trend since 2002, there was a notable decline during the peak of the financial crisis. 
Yet this seems not to have significantly affected the Nigerian economy because it is 
generally not dependent on aid inflows. More interestingly, credit to the private sector 
experienced robust growth from 2006 onwards. Also, GDP per capita grew 
considerably throughout the crisis period. Although the macro level seems to show no 
significant effects of the crises on the economy, the micro level shows a different 
picture, especially among the poor and vulnerable. In the following section, we 
describe the primary data used to investigate the impact of the crises on relevant 
dimensions of well-being.  
3 Data 
In early 2011, a household survey (hereafter referred to as the Lagos-Kano household 
survey, LKHS) was conducted in four deprived local government areas (LGAs) 
within the two selected states: Ikeja and Amuwo Odofin in Lagos, and Sabongari and 
Ungogo in Kano state. The selection of the two states, and the corresponding LGAs 
was based on geographical, economic, socio-political and security criteria aimed at 
capturing household heterogeneity across states and localities, and with the aim of 
capturing the effects of the food, fuel and financial crises on vulnerable groups, 
particularly women and children. Thus, while Kano and Lagos would capture the 
north-south spatial heterogeneity, Ikeja and Sabongari would reflect the urban context 
and Amuwo Odofin and Ungogo, the rural environments.  
The sampling frame was designed in a way to reduce the problem of exclusion bias 
from the non-probability sampling process, through random selection of households at 
the four LGAs, our primary sampling units (PSUs). This process was carried out as 
follows: first, the enumerators and fieldwork supervisors adopted transect walk 
methods in each of the selected LGAs in order to ascertain the spread and distribution 
of population in those localities and redefine the boundaries of LGAs. In the case of 
rural communities, the team requested permission from the community leaders to 
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carry out the survey and to get a sense of the estimated number of households in each 
LGA. Once the geographical boundaries were delimited, the team formed five clusters 
of 20 households from the cardinal directions: north, south, east, west and centre. The 
clusters were formed from a systematic sampling method involving the selection of 
households from an ordered sampling frame. A random starting point was first 
selected before enumerators began to follow a sampling interval of every 10th 
household to pick up a household for interview.  
The survey team targeted to interview 100 households in each LGA to obtain an 
overall sample size of 400 households across the two states. In the end, 399 
households were successfully interviewed, with an uneven distribution across the four 
locations (see Table ). It is important to point out that as with most non-probabilistic 
sampling methods, the results from the Lagos-Kano household survey, and which are 
presented in the sections below, must be taken with caution and cannot be used to 
infer generalisations over the overall population in Nigeria, but rather, to describe 
patterns and relationships occurring in the locations under analysis.  
Table 1: Sample target and achievement 
States and LGAs Targeted 
sample 
Achieved 
sample 
Lagos 200 199 
Ikeja 100 100 
Amuwo Odofin 100 99 
Kano 200 200 
Sabongari 100 87 
Ungogo 100 113 
Urban 200 174 
Rural 200 225 
Total 400 399 
Source: Lagos-Kano household survey. 
The survey questionnaire was designed to capture retrospective information on 
current and previous welfare outcomes, back to 2006 as the pre-crises starting point.4 
The use of retrospective data is increasingly being used in developing countries where 
pre-test and post-test data is often not available. Cost and administrative factors often 
limit regular collection of household data, and in our case, and with no existing 
disaggregated data at LGA level, retrospective questions were the best available 
option to capture key information on the variability of welfare outcomes during the 
periods in which the crises in question were observed. The rationale of our 
implementation strategy was based on the knowledge that the food and fuel price 
variability appeared in the years 2007, 2008, with a peak in 2009 for the former, 
especially in southern states, whereas the onset of the global financial crisis began in 
September 2008 and extended throughout 2009. More precisely, Nigeria was faced 
with food price variation beyond the observed long-term upward steady trend during 
2007, 2008 and 2009, whereas the fuel price increase was perceived during 2006 and 
2008. The sole effect of the food price variability may be captured in 2007, whereas 
the sole effect of the fuel price increases, in 2006. The effects of the global financial 
                                                
4 Questionnaire is available on request. 
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crisis may be captured in 2008 and in 2009 with the latter also likely to reflect more 
recent food price variability.  
Retrospective data thus allows us to measure the changes in reported welfare 
outcomes in those years and across the locations under examination, under the 
assumption that any observed change in outcomes is correlated with these covariate 
shocks, and to a lesser degree, to idiosyncratic events. There are two major limitations 
in this strategy: first, given that data on food and fuel prices is disaggregated at the 
state level, and having covered only two states through the household survey, we are 
unable to use price data to identify the impact of the food and fuel price variability 
through the econometric strategy and thus, we cannot separate the effects of the food 
and fuel crises, particularly in the years when more than one covariate shock was 
observed. In those cases, we cannot tell with precision whether a decline in welfare 
outcomes, say schooling, was due to a food price increase or because of the effect of a 
channel through which the global financial crisis was transmitted. Nonetheless, we 
can provide information about changes in welfare outcomes over the periods in which 
these crises were observed, and estimate the predicted probabilities that these changes 
in welfare were associated with the crises.  
Second, retrospective data can generate recall errors that can be systematically 
correlated with explanatory factors, particularly when the questions involved aim at 
measuring outcomes of subjective nature that are difficult for people to accurately 
remember. Recall errors can generate downward bias in the estimated coefficients. 
Several studies have shown that recall errors arising from retrospective data seem to 
be systematically correlated with household composition, suggesting that the 
inclusion of household size or any other intra-household related variable as controls in 
the regression equations can mitigate these biases (see Gibson 2002, Gibson and Kim 
2007, Battistin et al. 2003, Nakata et al. 2009). Therefore, we include in our 
specification strategy the dependency ratio to mitigate the potential effects of recall 
errors, and focus primarily on objective rather than subjective outcomes to limit other 
sources of biases. Nevertheless, our results should be treated with caution more in 
terms of impact size than on their direction or statistical power.  
4 Analytical approach 
In order to measure the impact of the food, fuel and financial crises, we have adopted 
three estimation strategies: first, we estimate a probit model based on an underlying 
response variable *iy  that is defined by  
*
i i iy X uβ= +     (1)  
where we can only observe a categorical outcome, y , that takes the values 
*1 0iy y= >  if    (if households report an outcome over the 2007-10 period, and y=0, 
otherwise. From equation (1) we estimate the predicted probabilities of observing the 
outcomes of interest, y, by computing 
Pr( 1| ) ( ) ( )i
X
i iY X t dt X
β φ β
−∞
= = = Φ∫     (2)  
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where  and  are the density of the distribution function and the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal, respectively, and X is a vector of 
household characteristics that contains the following control variables: (1) a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the household head is female, and zero otherwise; (2) 
a continuous variable that measures the age of the household head; (3) the 
dependency ratio used as a proxy to intra-household composition to capture the 
liquidity requirements for consumption expenditure, and which also helps to mitigate 
recall errors arising from retrospective data in subsequent estimations.  
Based on this specification, we run two models: Model I is estimated with a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the household resides in Lagos, and zero if the 
household resides in Kano. Model II is estimated with a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 for households living in urban areas (including Ikeja in Lagos and 
Sabongari in Kano), and zero for households residing in rural areas (in this case 
Amuwo Odofin in Lagos and Ungogo in Kano). By estimating equation (2), we are 
able to derive the marginal effects of one unit change in the explanatory variables 
contained in vector X , including the state and area dummies, on the probability of a 
change in the outcome variable over the 2007-10 period in which the crises were 
observed. 
Second, as the LKHS also collected discrete response variables of ordering nature, we 
estimate ordered probit equations, built as an extension of equation (1) where X  is 
the same vector of household characteristics described above, but y  is now observed 
having the following values: 0 if 0 <∗= iyy , i.e. if the outcome variable in year t-1 
was worse than in year t; 10 if 1 myy i <∗<= , i.e. if the outcome variable in year t-1 
remains equal or unchanged to year t, and 21 if 2 mymy i <∗<= , i.e. if the outcome 
variable in year t-1 was better than in year t. The latent variable can be seen as the 
propensity of households perceiving a change in welfare as a consequence of the 
factors in X  over the periods in which the food, fuel and financial crises were 
observed, with  and  being the unknown parameters. 
Finally, given that some continuous welfare outcomes exhibit a censored distribution, 
taking a maximum value and a lower zero threshold, our third estimation strategy 
adopts a Tobit model of similar structure as in equation (1), but now *iY=max(0,Y ) , i.e. 
*
iY=Y if 
*Y 0>  for households reporting making welfare-related decisions in times of 
crisis and *Y 0=  if *Y 0≤  otherwise, where the errors, given the information in X , 
are assumed to be normally distributed.  
By adopting a Tobit specification equation we were able to capture a more precise 
measure of the determinants of censored outcomes in the periods under which the 
crises were observed. The Tobit model is based on the assumption that the probability 
of observing Y 0i >  and Y 0i = are ( )φ ⋅  and *( 0) ( )ip Y < = Φ ⋅ , respectively, where  
and  denote the density function and the cumulative density function of the 
standard normal. The Tobit model generates three conditional mean functions.5 We 
are particularly interested in examining the observed factors affecting the incidence of 
                                                
5 For further details on the derivation of the conditional mean functions, see Greene (2003). 
( )φ ⋅ ( )Φ ⋅
sm sβ
( )φ ⋅
( )Φ ⋅
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the welfare outcomes in the 2007-10 period. In the following sub-sections we present 
the empirical results. 
5 Analysis 
As discussed earlier, the LKHS was conducted in deprived localities of Lagos and 
Kano and the quantile distribution of per capita income in Figure 2 confirms the level 
of deprivation among the sample population. Overall, more than two-thirds of 
households lived on less than US$1.25 a day, and the remaining 30 per cent had 
income levels that place them in a state of vulnerability. 
 Figure 2: Daily per capital income in US$ (2010) 
 
Source: authors’ estimations. 
In order to get a more precise profile of households, we estimated the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures (Foster et al. 1984) that take the following form 
FGT=1
n
∑ ቀz-y
z
ቁ
∝
n
i=1     (3)  
where z is the poverty line and α is the coefficient of variation taking the values α ≥ 0. 
For α = 0, the FGT becomes the headcount ratio that measures the number of people 
below the poverty line, i.e. the poverty incidence. For α = 1, the FGT becomes the 
poverty gap index, which captures the mean aggregate income shortfall relative to the 
poverty line across the sample population. In order words, the poverty gap index 
shows the amount of resources needed, in terms of per capita income, to bring the 
poor to the poverty line. For α = 2, the FGT measures the squared poverty gap, and 
which captures the severity of deprivation by taking into account the degree of 
inequality among the poor. Our results are presented in Table 3. 
All in all, our estimates show that 70 per cent of the surveyed households were below 
the World Bank’s US$1.25 a day poverty line, using the purchasing power parity 
(PPP) conversion factors for 2005, whereas nearly 90 per cent were below the US$2.5 
a day poverty line. In terms of regional differences, and focusing on the US$1.25 a 
day poverty line as reference point, households living in Kano reported a higher 
headcount index (73 per cent) than residents of the Lagos state (65 per cent), although 
the latter state reveals a higher squared poverty gap than Kano (42 per cent vis-à-vis 
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37 per cent), which seems to reflect the severity of poverty and inequality in areas of 
economic affluence in the country.  
Table 2: FGT Poverty indices by sample population, state and area 
 FGT (1) FGT (2) 
 α = 0 α = 1 α = 2 α = 0 α = 1 α = 2 
Sample population 0.70 0.47 0.39 0.88 0.64 0.53 
Kano 0.73 0.47 0.37 0.91 0.66 0.53 
Lagos 0.65 0.48 0.42 0.83 0.61 0.52 
Rural 0.66 0.41 0.30 0.88 0.61 0.47 
Urban 0.74 0.54 0.49 0.87 0.67 0.59 
Note: the FGT poverty indices in (1) are derived using the World Bank’s US$1.25 a day 
poverty line, whereas in (2), they are derived using the World Bank’s US$2.5 a day 
Source: Lagos-Kano household survey. 
In order to estimate the determinants of earning capacity, we regressed the annual 
household income in US$ of 2010 using a similar specification strategy as derived in 
equation (1). The results are presented as partial regression plots in Figure 3. The 
slope coefficients suggest that households living in Lagos have, on average, an annual 
income of US$1,395 (approximately US$3.8 a day) higher than the incomes reported 
from households living in Kano, which is similar to the income differentiation found 
between urban and rural areas (US$1,384). Equally important is the fact that the 
scattergrams reveal that, ceteris paribus, households headed by females have on 
average incomes significantly lower than households headed by men, at 
approximately US$133 less, and the results are significant at 1 per cent level. This 
brings a gender dimension into the issue of extreme poverty and vulnerability in the 
states and areas under investigation. In the following sub-sections we turn to the 
impact of the food price variability.  
Figure 3: Partial regression plots by state 
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Source: authors’ estimations. 
5.1 Food price increases 
Besides the effect of global food markets, food price increases in Nigeria can be 
linked to domestic factors associated with unfavourable weather conditions, including 
droughts in northern regions of the country and flooding in the coastal areas of the 
south. In September 2007, food prices rose sharply following an early dry season in 
the northern regions. Across major markets in northern Nigeria, including the 
Dawanau Market in Kano, retail prices of maize, millet, cowpeas and sorghum were 
reported to be significantly higher than in 2006 (USAID 2007). Food prices remained 
high following the price rise of diesel that increased the cost of food transportation.  
In coastal areas, including Lagos, concerns about food insecurity arose due to the 
effects of severe floods that occurred in 2009. Mobility of food traders was 
constrained by bad roads conditions, which drove food prices up. In the same areas, 
prices for maize and yam, the preferred substitutes for other staples such as rice, 
increased. By contrast, in northern states such as Kano, access to food was made 
easier by the combination of good food stocks (especially maize) and stable prices 
(see Figure 4 below).  
Although the level of average food prices had not experienced extreme variability in 
the period under examination, food prices of items such as maize, sorghum, yam, gary 
and rice had steady rising trends that may have significantly affected food security 
and other welfare outcomes, given low price elasticities of demand for these products. 
And because price increases across these staples seem to follow similar patterns, the 
effect of cross-price elasticities may have reduced the ability of poor and vulnerable 
households to effectively substitute for food products.   
As the LKHS collected retrospective information on the perceived increases in food 
prices, and the year the households recalled such increases to have occurred, we 
estimate the probabilities of households having experienced food price increases, 
conditional on a given vector of household characteristics. Table 3 presents the results 
from the two models derived in Section 4. From Model I, we find a 45 per cent higher 
chance that a household in Lagos experienced food price increases vis-à-vis 
households living in Kano, after controlling for the gender of the household head, 
dependency ratio and the age of the respondent. There is also a 0.6 per cent chance 
that households headed by older members suffered price increases. Increasing prices 
reduced household disposable incomes, thus potentially reducing households’ well-
being.  
In the second model, we control for the location of the household – whether it is in an 
urban or rural environment. The model shows a more significant relationship between 
age of head of household and the probability of experiencing rising food prices. Again 
urban households experienced more risks of food price increases than rural 
households. This comes as no surprise given that rural households are producer-
consumers, and hence are less reliant on food markets for their consumption. Our 
findings are also consistent with domestic price trends of staples reported by the 
National Bureau of Statistics (see Figure 4). 
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Table 3: Probability of experiencing a food price increase 
Independent variables Probit I (mfx) Probit II (mfx) 
State 0.445***  
 (0.0645)  
Woman -0.0682 0.00712 
 (0.142) (0.140) 
Depenratio 0.000525 8.04e-05 
 (0.000331) (0.000330) 
Age 0.00585* 0.00636** 
 (0.00316) (0.00313) 
Area  0.149** 
  (0.0737) 
Observations 215 215 
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.0230 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%.  
Source: authors’ estimations. 
Given the adverse effects of food price increases, we identify strategies adopted by 
vulnerable households to cope with food price variability. Correlation analysis 
indicates that residents of Lagos were more likely to shift consumption to substitute 
goods which were cheaper. They also adopted radical measures like reducing food 
consumption, especially among mothers and children. They resorted to consumption 
smoothing, and also worked longer hours to compensate for income lost through price 
increases. Residents of Kano relied more on dissaving and borrowing to cope with 
rising food prices. Households also resorted to withdrawing their children from 
school, either because they could not afford the school fees, or because they wanted 
the children to assist with mobilising financial resources for the upkeep of the family, 
leading to an increase in the incidence of child labour. Although these strategies are 
generally short-term, they often have long-term implications for household welfare. In 
the following sections, we focus on school dropouts and child labour as relevant 
welfare losses that might arise from these coping strategies.  
5.2 School dropouts 
The rationale of examining the relationship between food price variability and school 
dropouts comes from evidence showing a strong relationship between poor academic 
and cognitive performance and food insecurity, which in turn impact on people’s 
future inabilities to increase labour productivity and income (see Glewwe et al. 2009, 
Glewwe and King 2001, and also Masino and Niño-Zarazúa, forthcoming for a 
systematic review on the topic). 
Early school dropouts impose constraints on children as they are unable to adapt to 
changing economic circumstances, nor to effectively use their knowledge and skills to 
exploit social arrangements and income opportunities more easily (Becker 1993). 
Education also helps children to make informed decisions in adulthood, and to be 
treated with respect in given social contexts. 
The LKHS collected information about school dropouts, the year of occurrence as 
well as the reasons that led to a deterioration in school performance and ultimately, 
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school dropouts. An initial examination of the data (presented in Table 4) reveals a 
significant jump in the reported incidence of school dropouts during 2008, which 
coincides with the global financial crisis. We also find a significant correlation at the 
5 per cent level, in the higher rates of school dropouts in Lagos relative to the rates 
observed in Kano. Strikingly, the correlations suggest that the rate of school dropouts 
is more severe in rural areas of Lagos and Kano, and that pattern may also be 
capturing attitudes toward schooling in rural communities of Nigeria. These 
correlations, however, do not provide more precise information on other determinants 
of school dropouts.  
Table 4: Year of school dropout (all children) 
Year of 
school 
dropout 
Area  State 
Rural Urban Kano Lagos 
 Freq Percent Freq Percent Freq Percent Freq Percent 
         
None 211** (90.56) 186** (92.54) 199** (91.71) 198** (91.24) 
< 2006 6** (2.575) 1** (0.498) 6** (2.765) 1** (0.461) 
2007 1** (0.429) 5** (2.488) 1** (0.461) 5** (2.304) 
2008 14** (6.009) 5** (2.488) 7** (3.226) 12** (5.530) 
2009   2** (0.995) 1** (0.461) 1** (0.461) 
2010 1** (0.429) 2** (0.995) 3** (1.382)   
         
Total 233  201  217  217  
Note: The statistically significant association in the cross-tabulations is indicated by the Chi-
square values for the cell as a whole: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 
1%.  
Source: authors’ estimations. 
In order to estimate the propensity of school dropouts by year of occurrence, we 
estimate a probit model similar to the one derived in Section 4, where the dependent 
variable y  takes the value 1=y  if a child stops going to school before completing 
the grade, and 0=y  otherwise. We include the same vector of household 
characteristics X derived earlier but now we include a dummy variable ‘girl’, in 
substitution of ‘women’, to control for the effects of being a girl on the probability of 
dropping out school. The marginal effects of the slope coefficients are presented in 
the Appendix Table A1.  
 
 
  
 14
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
N
a
i
r
a
Gary (yellow)
Kano
Lagos
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
N
a
i
r
a
Maize grain (white)
Kano
Lagos
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
N
a
i
r
a
Local Rice 
Kano
Lagos
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
N
a
i
r
a
Yam (tuber)
Kano
Lagos
Figure 4: Average annual prices of key staples by locality (prices in Naira per kilo) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics. 
 15
The results are statistically insignificant for most variables, with one exception: being 
a girl increases the probability of experiencing an early school dropout. In 2006 and 
2007, a girl living in Lagos faced, on average, a 2 per cent higher probability of 
dropping out school than a boy living in the same locality. By 2008, the odds of a 
girl dropping out school had increased up to 10 per cent and the strength of the 
correlation is significant at the 1 per cent level. A similar pattern is also found among 
girls living in urban areas. The evidence suggests that there is a connection between 
increasing the likelihood of dropping out of school and aggregate shocks, particularly 
given the jump of the coefficient in 2008. However, given the possibility of lag 
effects arising from the food price variability of 2007, it is unfeasible to separate the 
two effects.  
Indeed, Figure 5 shows that more than half of those children who reported a decline in 
school performance (which ultimately led to school dropouts) could concentrate less, 
were more tired, and had less time for studying. The former cause is linked to the 
issue of food insecurity, whereas the latter, to the prevalence of child labour. We 
discuss the issue of child labour in the next section. All in all, the results reveal a 
significant gender bias in terms of educational opportunities for children, with 
covariate shocks exacerbating the prevailing gender inequalities, which in turn limit 
girls’ prospects for future labour market opportunities.  
Figure 5: Causes for a deterioration in school performance 
 
Source: authors’ estimations. 
5.3 Child labour 
Child labour, in its various forms, is often associated with poverty, household 
composition, social norms and labour market conditions (Grootaert and Kanbur 
1995). In environments of aggregate vulnerabilities, and where substitution effects 
exist between parents’ and children’s time use, child labour becomes an important 
source of income. Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) pointed out that the mutually 
opposing direction between schooling and child labour may not necessarily be so if 
child labour does not act as substitute of children’s time in school. Other studies have 
also pointed out that child labour often facilitates children’s school progression, as it 
lifts household’s budgetary constraints (Maharatna 1997, Grootaert 1998, Weiner 
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1991). Thus, our concern has more to do with the intensity of child labour and its 
harmful forms than with its existence.  
In Figure 6, we plot the number of hours children worked during the 2007-10 periods 
relative to their age. The scatter plot shows that the incidence of child labour during 
2007 and 2008 began at the age of six, with these frequencies showing a low intensity 
of labour in terms of hours worked relative to children of similar age during 2009 and 
2010. The small hollow squares in red (7.32 percent) on the lower right-hand side of 
the scattergram show small children being engaged in full-time productive activities, 
and this may connect with our earlier discussion on the factors that cause deterioration 
of school performance and dropping out of school during that period. Nevertheless, it 
is important to highlight the fact that more than 90 per cent of children were not 
engaged in productive activities, and most of those that were working at the time the 
survey was conducted, did work part time, in a range of 30 to 50 hours per month. 
Although illustrative, Figure 5 provides limited information about the factors that 
determine child labour, and whether these determinants change over the periods under 
which the food, fuel and 2008 financial crisis became apparent. 
Figure 6: Intensity of child labour by age and reported year 
 
Source: authors’ estimates. 
Given the censored distribution of the number of hours children worked during the 
2007-10 periods, which takes a maximum value and a lower threshold zero (see the 
observations clustered around zero hours on the left hand-side of Figure ), we decided 
to estimate a Tobit model as derived in Section 4, but now *),0max( YYi = , i.e. 
0* if * >= YYY  for children engaged in labour activities, 0* if 0* ≤= YY  for 
children who are not engaged in productive activities, with the standard errors 
following a normal distribution. By adopting a Tobit specification equation, we were 
able to capture a more precise measure of the determinants of child labour in the 
periods under examination. The Tobit model generates three conditional mean 
functions. We are particularly interested in examining the observed factors affecting 
the incidence of child labour in the 2007-10 periods. The results from the Tobit 
equations are presented in Tables 5a and 5b. 
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Overall, the results show that, other things held constant, age and the dependency 
ratio are positively correlated with the propensity of child labour. Both results are 
consistent with our expectations and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
First, the intensity of child labour increases as children get older and become able to 
generate income for the family. Second, higher dependency ratios seem to impose 
greater liquidity requirements on households to satisfy their consumption needs, and 
as the budgetary constraints increase, so do the incentives for parents to use older 
children’s time to generate income. The results also show that children living in 
Lagos have, on average, a lower propensity to work relative to children living in 
Kano. The results are consistent over the period under examination and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. We observe a moderate decline in the number of 
hours worked, from 102 hours per month in 2007 to 98 hours in 2008, to then increase 
to 106 hours per month in 2009.  
Table 5a: Incidence of child labour by year (dependent variable: number of hours worked per 
month) 
Independent 
variables 
Tobit I Tobit II 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 
State 
-
102.2*** 
-
98.20*** 
-
106.7*** 
-
91.44*** 
    
 (38.58) (34.17) (34.12) (26.02)     
Area     
-
121.4*** 
-
116.8*** 
-74.55** -30.34 
     (45.28) (40.54) (30.14) (20.97) 
Woman 22.96 14.82 12.73 -9.929 17.65 10.06 9.048 -12.48 
 (24.97) (21.59) (21.67) (17.50) (24.49) (21.23) (21.27) (17.62) 
Depenratio 0.342*** 0.364*** 0.438*** 0.307*** 0.337*** 0.359*** 0.447*** 0.344*** 
 (0.105) (0.0897) (0.0885) (0.0708) (0.104) (0.0885) (0.0892) (0.0737)
Age 13.60*** 12.76*** 12.33*** 9.008*** 12.68*** 11.92*** 11.66*** 8.555*** 
 (3.495) (3.015) (2.797) (2.087) (3.413) (2.945) (2.758) (2.095) 
Constant 
-
430.2*** 
-
389.5*** 
-
393.7*** 
-
289.3*** 
-
413.9*** 
-
375.1*** 
-
392.4*** 
-
306.4*** 
 (78.76) (66.02) (60.37) (42.46) (76.92) (64.53) (60.74) (44.86) 
         
Observations 779 779 779 779 779 779 779 779 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%. The ‘state’ variable is dummy with a value Lagos=1 and Kano=0; 
‘woman’ is a dummy with value woman=1, man=0; ‘depenratio’ measures the dependency 
ratio; age measures the age of the household head, and ‘area’ is a dummy with a value 
urban=1 and rural=0. Model I: Equation with state as explanatory variable. Model II: Equation 
with area as explanatory variable. 
Source: authors’ estimations. 
In Table 5b, we estimate a Tobit equation using logarithmic functions of the number 
of hours worked per month, which by taking the antilog of the slope coefficients, 
allows us to calculate the percentage change in the propensity of child labour. The 
results from 2007 suggest that the median of the propensity of child labour in Lagos 
was lower than the one observed in Kano by approximately 99.4 per cent (i.e.
994.0138.5 −=−e ). The higher incidence of child labour in Kano during that year 
coincides with a sharp increase in food prices, following the unfavourable weather 
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conditions registered that year, which may have pushed families to embark on drastic 
coping mechanisms, including child labour, in an effort to ease the negative income 
effect from the food price increase.  
The high propensity of child labour in Kano during 2009 remains unclear given that 
weather conditions during that year were relatively stable. Equation Tobit II, which 
includes a dummy that controls for urban versus rural areas suggests that while the 
higher propensity of child labour observed during 2007 can be indeed associated with 
the rural labour markets, the peak observed in 2009 is less pronounced in rural areas. 
That suggests that factors other than food price variability might be associated with 
the higher propensity of child labour in that particular year.  
Table 5b: Incidence of child labour (dependent variable: logarithm of the number of hours 
worked per month) 
Independent 
variables 
Tobit I Tobit II 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 
         
State -5.138*** -5.067*** -5.000*** -4.468***     
 (1.817) (1.642) (1.502) (1.239)     
Area     -5.759*** -5.681*** -3.272** -1.553 
     (2.112) (1.925) (1.321) (1.010) 
Woman 0.877 0.479 0.597 -0.465 0.618 0.238 0.434 -0.595 
 (1.151) (1.013) (0.934) (0.830) (1.142) (1.009) (0.936) (0.847) 
Depenratio 0.0162*** 0.0181*** 0.0195*** 0.0153*** 0.0163*** 0.0182*** 0.0204*** 0.0173*** 
 (0.00493) (0.00432) (0.00392) (0.00343) (0.00493) (0.00432) (0.00405) (0.00362) 
Age 0.696*** 0.672*** 0.575*** 0.467*** 0.659*** 0.637*** 0.552*** 0.447*** 
 (0.168) (0.148) (0.124) (0.101) (0.166) (0.146) (0.125) (0.103) 
Constant -20.41*** -18.95*** -17.36*** -14.08*** -19.96*** -18.56*** -17.71*** -15.06*** 
 (3.852) (3.290) (2.754) (2.129) (3.818) (3.265) (2.837) (2.274) 
         
Observations 779 779 779 779 779 779 779 779 
Note: see Table 5a. 
Source: authors’ estimations. 
5.4 Employment opportunities 
Labour markets are a fundamental channel through which covariate shocks affect 
poor and vulnerable households. For the poor and vulnerable with limited capital 
endowments, income-generating activities, self-employment and seasonal waged 
labour represent the most important sources of income. Data from the LKHS shows 
that only 27 per cent of household members were waged employees and this reflects 
the heavy reliance of the poor and vulnerable on self-employment and informal labour 
arrangements.  
The survey collected information on the number of days per week household 
members worked during the hungry season, as during that period (April-July) the poor 
and vulnerable, particularly in rural areas, face the highest level of food insecurity. 
We generate an outcome variable that captures work intensity, and which is computed 
as the sum of units of labour (measured in days) members of the household worked 
over that season. A closer examination of this variable reveals a censored distribution, 
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as more than 10 per cent of the sampled households were not engaged in income- 
generating activities or waged work by the time the survey was conducted. For that 
reason, we estimate a Tobit equation. Since we have a data censoring case demanding 
the latent variable to follow a homoskedastic normal distribution, we transform iY  
into logarithmic form to make this assumption more reasonable. The results from the 
Tobit regression equations are presented in Tables 6a and 6b. 
Table 6a: Intensity of labour during the hungry season (dependent variable: number of days 
per week household members worked during the hungry season (April-July)) 
Independent 
variables 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
Tobit I Tobit II Tobit I Tobit II Tobit I Tobit II Tobit I Tobit II 
         
State -1.147  -2.226  -0.0871  -3.960  
 (8.985)  (8.782)  (9.135)  (8.381)  
Woman -14.63 -14.15 -11.12 -10.66 -10.74 -10.21 -12.11 -11.98 
 (15.01) (14.94) (14.65) (14.58) (15.25) (15.19) (13.99) (13.93) 
Depenratio 0.0412 0.0309 0.0452 0.0348 0.0323 0.0222 -0.0167 -0.0228 
 (0.0490) (0.0480) (0.0479) (0.0469) (0.0498) (0.0488) (0.0460) (0.0451) 
Age 6.777*** 6.768*** 6.957*** 6.964*** 7.510*** 7.490*** 8.818*** 8.864*** 
 (1.860) (1.850) (1.819) (1.808) (1.894) (1.884) (1.743) (1.733) 
Age2 -
0.0656*** 
-
0.0663*** 
-
0.0672*** 
-
0.0680***
-
0.0729*** 
-
0.0733*** 
-
0.0882*** 
-
0.0893***
 (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0187) (0.0186) 
Area  -11.61  -13.13  -9.960  -11.36 
  (8.830)  (8.630)  (8.976)  (8.237) 
Constant -10.29 -3.021 -13.37 -6.116 -26.65 -19.59 -41.54 -37.39 
 (42.35) (41.79) (41.41) (40.83) (43.13) (42.54) (39.64) (39.09) 
         
Observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 
Note: see Table 5a. 
Source: authors’ estimations. 
Overall, the results show that, other things held constant, the age and age squared 
variables are consistent with what theory would predict, i.e. an increasing relationship 
between work and age, but at a decreasing rate: in 2007, an additional year of age 
increased the propensity of days household members worked during the hungry 
season by 9.5 per cent, which represents about 6.8 days per week. And that rate 
dropped by 0.1 per cent every year. We also observe a steady increase in the level of 
work intensity relative to age in subsequent years (2008, 2009 and 2010), and those 
results are significant at the 1 per cent level.  
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Table 6b: Intensity of labour during the hungry season (dependent variable: logarithm of days 
per week all household members worked during the hungry season (April-July)) 
Independent 
variables 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
Tobit I Tobit II Tobit I Tobit II Tobit I Tobit II Tobit I Tobit II 
         
State 0.00789  -0.0119  0.0636  -0.0352  
 (0.170)  (0.161)  (0.175)  (0.0411)  
Woman -0.270 -0.257 -0.148 -0.133 -0.218 -0.201 -0.0986 -0.106 
 (0.283) (0.282) (0.269) (0.267) (0.292) (0.291) (0.0686) (0.0683) 
Depenratio 0.00135 0.00112 0.00160* 0.00132 0.00140 0.00114 -6.96e-
05 
-4.13e-
06 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Age 0.0954**
* 
0.0948*
** 
0.102*** 0.101*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.0363**
* 
0.0365**
* 
 (0.0351) (0.0349) (0.0333) (0.0331) (0.0362) (0.0360) (0.00901
) 
(0.00902
) 
age2 -
0.00118*
** 
-
0.00118
*** 
-
0.00124*
** 
-
0.00125*
** 
-
0.00133
*** 
-
0.00133*
** 
-
0.000292
*** 
-
0.00029
2*** 
 (0.00037
6) 
(0.0003
74) 
(0.00035
8) 
(0.00035
5) 
(0.0003
88) 
(0.00038
6) 
(9.93e-
05) 
(9.94e-
05) 
area  -0.218  -0.285*  -0.160  0.00828 
  (0.167)  (0.158)  (0.172)  (0.0402) 
Constant 2.721*** 2.886*** 2.612*** 2.806*** 2.277*** 2.456*** 4.125*** 4.092*** 
 (0.799) (0.788) (0.760) (0.747) (0.824) (0.813) (0.199) (0.198) 
         
Observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 365 365 
Note: see Table 5a. 
Source: authors’ estimations. 
Further, we find a negative relationship between both the ‘state’ and ‘area’ variables 
and the proxy indicator for work intensity. There is an increase in labour supply 
during 2008 and 2010, which might reflect how poor rural households cope with food 
insecurity during periods of food inflation and aggregate vulnerabilities. However, 
although the information suggests that residents of Lagos, and especially in urban 
areas, were not forced to work as much as people living in Kano and in rural areas, 
the correlations were not strong enough, in statistical terms, to confirm that 
association. The only exception is 2008 as during that year, the median of the 
propensity of work intensity in Lagos was lower than that of Kano by approximately 
24.8 per cent. The results are in line with our findings with regard to child labour, 
which point at children living in Lagos having on average a lower propensity to work, 
relative to children living in Kano. 
6 Conclusion 
This study has examined the impacts of the food, fuel and financial crises on 
livelihoods of low-income households in Nigeria using household survey data. It 
started with a general analysis of the origins of the crises, followed by an analysis of 
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the impacts, especially on SSA. It has been shown that the crises had differential 
impacts within and between countries. Some countries responded to the food crisis by 
banning exports, while others reduced and/or removed trade taxes. In SSA in 
particular, the crises resulted in social unrest, rising inflation and growth in poverty, 
among other adverse effects and these outcomes differed between countries. In the 
case of Nigeria, it has been shown that the fuel crisis did not have significant impact 
because of the price subsidisation.  
The financial crisis did not seem to have significant direct micro-level impacts 
because remittances did not fall significantly, and the country is not aid-dependent. 
Yet, our results indicate that aggregate shocks had a significant adverse effect on 
household consumption, human capital and labour decisions with a degree of 
variability in their impacts and coping mechanisms between northern and southern 
areas of the country. The food crisis had the most severe and significant impact on 
poor and vulnerable households. It is important to point out that the food price 
variability observed in Nigeria has as much (if not more) to do with domestic factors 
associated with erratic weather conditions and poor transport infrastructure, as with 
variations in international food prices.  
The analysis also finds that in general, households responded to the crises in various 
ways, including increasing the intensity of work, withdrawing children from school, 
especially girls, shifting consumption to cheap substitutes, and engaging their children 
in child labour. These decisions were found to vary according to regional and rural-
urban conditions. 
Early school dropouts and the active engagement of children in labour activities are in 
particular sources of great concern, as they impose constraints on children’s future 
welfare prospects that can potentially lock them in a low economic equilibrium or 
poverty trap. The fact that gender bias in terms of educational opportunities is 
pervasive – with covariate shocks exacerbating the prevailing gender inequalities – 
underlines the need for policy responses that while addressing the effects of covariate 
risks more generally, can also deal with important sources of inequalities.  
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Appendix Table A1. Predicted probabilities of school dropouts by year (dependent variable: 
reported year of school dropout) 
Year of school 
dropout 
Independent 
variables 
Ordered probit I 
(mfx) 
Ordered probit II 
(mfx) 
None State 0.0101  
  (0.0259)  
 Girl -0.204*** -0.200*** 
  (0.0554) (0.0550) 
 Depenratio -0.000114 -0.000121 
  (0.000102) (0.000101) 
 Area  0.00381 
   (0.0260) 
< 2006 State -0.00168  
  (0.00442)  
 Girl 0.0250** 0.0247** 
  (0.0117) (0.0116) 
 Depenratio 1.92e-05 2.02e-05 
  (2.05e-05) (2.05e-05) 
 Area  -0.000639 
   (0.00441) 
2007 State -0.00150  
  (0.00371)  
 Girl 0.0240** 0.0237** 
  (0.0105) (0.0106) 
 Depenratio 1.71e-05 1.80e-05 
  (1.79e-05) (1.77e-05) 
 Area  -0.000569 
   (0.00384) 
2008 State -0.00520  
  (0.0133)  
 Girl 0.103*** 0.101*** 
  (0.0367) (0.0362) 
 Depenratio 5.92e-05 6.23e-05 
  (5.08e-05) (4.91e-05) 
 Area  -0.00197 
   (0.0135) 
2009 State -0.000598  
  (0.00161)  
 Girl 0.0155 0.0150 
  (0.0104) (0.0103) 
 Depenratio 6.79e-06 7.13e-06 
  (7.06e-06) (7.41e-06) 
 Area  -0.000225 
   (0.00149) 
2010 State -0.00108  
  (0.00305)  
 Girl 0.0367** 0.0359** 
  (0.0170) (0.0162) 
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 Depenratio 1.23e-05 1.31e-05 
  (1.26e-05) (1.34e-05) 
 Area  -0.000413 
   (0.00279) 
 Observations 427 427 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%. The ‘state’ variable is dummy with a value Lagos=1 and Kano=0; ‘girl’ is 
a dummy with value 1 if girl aged <18 and zero if boy; ‘depenratio’ measures the dependency 
ratio; age measures the age of the household head, and ‘area’ is a dummy with a value 
urban=1 and rural=0. Model I: Equation with state as explanatory variable. Model II: Equation 
with area as explanatory variable. 
Source: author’s estimations. 
